## TO SEE SHOCKLEY/DORE ARTICLE.

7 in the 2011 Legislative Session. he definition of aid in dying set FOLLOW ARROW ctors with express immunity from

civil and professional sanction so long as they complied with state law, and protect doctors who provide aid in dying from arbitrary increases to their malpractice insurance premiums. In some ways SB 167 narrowed the scope of aid in dying set out in Baxter. For instance, it prohibited physician aid in dying for non-residents and persons under the age of 18. It also imposed additional patient protections, which are not required by Baxter, including a stringent standard of care for physicians.<sup>17</sup> While SB 167 ultimately died, its defeat signified a disagreement over proper regulation, rather than a rejection of physician aid in dying.

Meanwhile, opponents of aid in dying introduced two bills in the 2011 Legislative Session which sought to overturn Baxter and outlaw physician aid in dying in Montana. However, a bipartisan majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the full Senate, rejected the bills.<sup>18</sup> Adding weight to the decision by the Montana Supreme Court, in Baxter, a bipartisan majority of the Senate expressly defended the rights of terminally ill patients to make their own end-oflife decisions through legislative action.

The ultimate issue of whether the Montana Constitution protects the rights of terminally ill patients to opt for physician aid in dying would be resolved only if the Legislature outlaws aid in dying. Hopefully, that day will never come. In the meantime, physician aid in dying is the law of the land. Doctors who follow Baxter will not go to jail and terminally ill patients, rather than moralistic crusaders, get to choose how they live out their last days.

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#### NOTES

- 1. 2009 MT 449.
- 2. 2008 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 482, \*64.
- 3. Id. at \*46.
- 4. Although the Court's holding applied solely to homicide charges under MCA 45-5-102(1), the Court ruled out the viability of other criminal charges brought against physicians who provide aid in dying. Baxter, ¶ 44.
  - 5. Id. at ¶ 32.
- 6. Baxter does not define "terminal illness." Instead it leaves this determination to the physician. Although Baxter relied on the Terminally III Act, the Court clearly did not adopt the definition of "terminal condition" contained in MCA 50-9-102(16) Mr. Baxter, who was found to have a "terminal illness," would not have fit the definition of "terminal condition" because he did not require "life-sustaining treatment."
- 7. ¶¶ 12,13,49. The Court also noted that in the typical aid in dying situation, the solicitation comes from the patient, not the doctor. ¶ 44. However, merely informing the patient of her legal right to aid in dving is unlikely to constitute "solicitation" so as to make the consent defense unavailable.
  - 8. MCA 45-2-211.
  - 9. 209 Mont. 169, 174, 679 P.2d 1237, 1240 (1984).
- 11. Neither the statute nor caselaw describe the defense of "consent" as an affirmative defense. While most affirmative criminal defenses require proof beyond a preponderance of the evidence, the affirmative defense of self-defense requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not use justifiable use force after "the defendant has offered evidence of justifiable use of force." MCA 46-16-131. Even if the Court disregards Desilva, in no case will doctors charged with homicide, be required to do more than prove it was more probable than not they complied with Baxter.
  - 12. MCA 50-9-106.
  - 13. A prosecutor, in theory, could prosecute anyone for virtually any reason.
- 14. The standard of care simply requires doctors providing aid in dying to follow the requirements set forth in Baxter.
- 15. It is unlikely that a doctor who complies with Baxter could breach a duty of care to a patient. Additionally, the patient's self-administration of the life-ending medication could be treated as a superseding/intervening cause.
- 16. The public policy supporting aid in dying is derived from the Terminally III Act which the Court specifically noted only applies to individuals over the age of 18. Baxter, ¶¶ 29,38. Hence, a strong presumption exists that the Court implicitly intended aid in dying to apply to individuals over the age of 18. The consent defense may further limit aid in dying for some minors because it cannot be invoked when consent is "given by a person who by reason of youth...is unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute the offense." MCA 45-2-211(2)(b).
  - 17. SB 167; available at http://data.opi.mt.gov/bills/2011/billhtml/SB0167.htm
  - 18. SB 116, SB 169.

# No, physician-assisted suicide is <u>not</u> legal in Montana

It's a recipe for elder abuse and more

By State Senator Jim Shockley and Margaret Dore

There are two states where physician-assisted suicide is legal: Oregon and Washington. These states have statutes that give doctors and others who participate in a qualified patient's suicide immunity from criminal and civil liability. (ORS 127.800-995 and RCW 70.245).

In Montana, by contrast, the law on assisted suicide is governed by the Montana Supreme Court decision, Baxter v. State, 354 Mont. 234 (2009). Baxter gives doctors who assist a patient's suicide a potential defense to criminal prosecution. Baxter does not legalize assisted suicide by giving doctors or anyone else immunity from criminal and civil liability. Under

Baxter, a doctor cannot be assured that a suicide will qualify for the defense. Some assisted suicide proponents nonetheless claim that *Baxter* has legalized assisted suicide in Montana.

Legalizing assisted suicide in Montana would be a recipe for elder abuse. The practice has multiple other problems.

## What is physician-assisted suicide?

The American Medical Association (AMA) states: "Physician assisted suicide occurs when a physician facilitates a patient's death by providing the necessary means and/or information to enable the patient to perform the life-ending act." (Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 2.211). For example, a "physician provides sleeping pills and information about the lethal dose, while aware that the patient may commit suicide."

Baxter found that there was no indication in Montana law that physician-assisted suicide, which the Court termed "aid in dying," is against public policy. (354 Mont. at 240, Para 13, 49-50). Based on this finding, the Court held that a patient's consent to aid in dying "constitutes a statutory defense to a

charge of homicide against the aiding physician." (*Id.* at 251, Para 50).

Baxter, however, overlooked elder abuse. The Court stated that the only person "who might conceivably be prosecuted for criminal behavior is the physician who prescribes a lethal dose of medication." (354 Mont. at 239, Para 11). The Court thereby overlooked criminal behavior by family members and others who benefit from a patient's death, for example, due to an inheritance.

Baxter also overlooked caselaw imposing civil liability on persons who cause or fail to prevent a suicide. See Krieg v. Massey, 239 Mont. 469, 472-3 (1989) and Nelson v. Driscoll, 295 Mont. 363, Para 32-33 (1999). Baxter is, regardless, a narrow decision in which doctors cannot be assured that a suicide will qualify for the defense. Attorneys Greg Jackson and Matt Bowman provide this analysis:

If the idea of suicide itself is suggested to the patient first by the doctor or even by the family, instead of being on the patient's sole initiative, the situation exceeds "aid in dying" as conceived by the Court. If a particular suicide decision process is anything but "private, civil, and compassionate," . . . , the Court's decision wouldn't guarantee a consent defense. If the patient is less than "conscious," is unable to "vocalize" his decision, or gets help because he is unable to "self-administer," or the drug fails and someone helps complete the killing, *Baxter* would not apply.

No doctor can prevent these human contingencies from occurring in a given case . . . in order to make sure that he can later use the consent defense if he is charged with murder. (Analysis of Implications of the *Baxter* Case on Potential Criminal Liability, Spring 2010, at *www.montan ansagainstassistedsuicide.org/p/baxter-case-analysis.html)* 

#### The 2011 Legislative Session

The 2011 legislative session featured two bills in response to *Baxter*, both of which failed: SB 116, which would have eliminated *Baxter*'s potential defense; and SB 167, which would have legalized assisted suicide by providing doctors and others with immunity from criminal and civil liability.

During a hearing on SB 167, the bill's sponsor, Senator Anders Blewett, said: "[U]nder current law, there's nothing to protect the doctor from prosecution." (http://maasdocuments files.wordpress.com/2011/07/blewett speckhart\_trans 001.pdf). Dr. Stephen Speckart made a similar statement: "[M]ost physicians feel significant dis-ease with the limited safeguards and possible risk of criminal prosecution after the Baxter decision." (Id. at p.2)

### Legalization would create new paths of abuse

In Montana, there has been a rapid growth of elder abuse. Elders' vulnerabilities and larger net worth make them a target for financial abuse. The perpetrators are often family members motivated by an inheritance. See e. g. www.metlife.com/assets/cao/mmi/publications/studies/mmi-study-broken-trust-elders-family-finances.pdf.

Preventing elder abuse is official Montana state policy. See e.g., 52-3-801, MCA. If Montana would legalize physician-

assisted suicide, a new path of abuse would be created against the elderly, which would be contrary to that policy. Alex Schadenberg, chair of the Euthanasia Prevention Coalition, International, states:

With assisted suicide laws in Oregon, perpetrators can . . . take a "legal" route, by getting an elder in Washington and to sign a lethal dose request. Once the prescription is filled, there is no supervision over the administration . . . [E]ven if a patient struggled, "who would know?" (http://www.isb .idaho.gov/pdf/advocate/issues/adv10oct.pdf, p. 14.)

## "Terminally ill" does not mean dying

Baxter's potential defense applies when patients are "terminally ill," which Baxter does not define. In Oregon, "terminal" patients are defined as those having less than six months to live. Such persons are not necessarily dying. Doctors can be wrong. Moreover, treatment can lead to recovery. Oregon resident Jeanette Hall, who was diagnosed with cancer and told that she had six months to a year to live, said:

I wanted to do our [assisted suicide] law and I wanted my doctor to help me. Instead, he encouraged me to not give up . . . I had both chemotherapy and radiation . . . It is now 10 years later. If my doctor had believed in assisted suicide, I would be dead. (http://mtstandard.com/news/opinion/mailbag/article\_aeef3982-9a98-lldf-8db2-001cc4c002eO.html)

## Legal physician-assisted suicide empowered the Oregon Health Plan, not individual patients

Once a patient is labeled "terminal," an easy argument can be made that his treatment should be denied. This has happened in Oregon where patients labeled "terminal" have not only been denied coverage for treatment, they have been offered assisted-suicide instead.

The most well known cases involve Barbara Wagner and Randy Stroup. (KATU TV, at <a href="https://www.katu.com/news/261195">www.katu.com/news/261195</a>
39.html. ABC News, at <a href="https://www.abcnews.go.com/Health/Story">www.abcnews.go.com/Health/Story</a>
?id=5517492, and Ken Stevens, MD, at pp. 16-17, at <a href="http://choiceillusionoregon.blogspot.com/p/oregons-mistake-costslives.html">http://choiceillusionoregon.blogspot.com/p/oregons-mistake-costslives.html</a>). The Oregon Health Plan refused to pay for their suicides instead. Neither Wagner nor Stroup saw this as a celebration of their "choice." Wagner said: "I'm not ready to die." Stroup said: "This is my life they're playing with."

Stroup and Wagner were steered to suicide and it was the Oregon Health Plan doing the steering. Oregon's law empowered the Oregon Health Plan, not individual patients.

#### Oregon's studies are invalid

Oregon's statute does not require a doctor to be present when the lethal dose is administered. (ORS 127.800-995). During a hearing on SB 167, Senator Jeff Essmann made a related point, as follows:

More NOT LEGAL, Page 25